Winch, Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Critical Social Theory  

Oleh:

Pleasants, Nigel

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: History of the Human Sciences vol. 13 no. 1 (Feb. 2000), page 78–91.
Topik: critical social theory; Giddens; Habermas; Wittgenstein
Fulltext: 78.pdf (186.6KB)

Isi artikel

The received understanding of Winch’s critique of social science is that he propounded a radically relativist, anti-explanatory and a-critical conception of the legitimate task of ‘social studies’. This conception is presumed to be predicated upon an extension of Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy. I argue, against this view, that Winch reads Wittgenstein through a Kantian framework, and that in fact he advanced a rigorously essentialist and universalist picture of ‘social phenomena’. It is Winch’s underlying Kantian metaphysics that has made his ideas attractive to contemporary architects of critical social theory, such as Giddens and Habermas. However, in opposition to the latter, and in spite of his Kantianism, I discern in Winch a genuinely critical attitude towards social understanding.

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