Presidential Address : Issuers, Underwriter Syndicates, and Aftermarket Transparency  

Oleh:

Green, Richard C.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 62 no. 4 (Aug. 2007), page 1529-1550.
Topik: transparency; studies; models; underwriting pools; competition; equilibrium; investors; secondary markets
Fulltext: p 1529.pdf (161.26KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

I model strategic interaction among issuers, underwriters, retail investors, and institutional investors when the secondary market has limited price transparency. Search costs for retail investors lead to price dispersion in the secondary market, while the price for institutional investors is infinitely elastic. Because ritel distribution capacity is assumed to be limited for each underwriter - dealer, bertrand competition breaks down in the primary market and new issues are udnerpriced in equilibrium. Syndicates emerge in which underwriters bid symmetrically, with quantities allocated internally to efficiently utilize retail distribution capacity.

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