The Merger Paradox and Why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in The Laboratory  

Oleh:

Huck, Steffen ; Konrad, Kai A. ; Muller, Wieland ; Normann, Hans-Theo

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 117 no. 522 (Jul. 2007), page 1073-1095.
Topik: PARADOX; studies; game theory; Acquisitions & mergers; bargaining
Fulltext: 1073.pdf (184.23KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.26 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

We study the merger paradox, a relative of Harsanyi's bargaining paradox, in an experiment. We examine bilateral mergers in experimental Cournot markets with initially three or four firms. Standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium predicts total outputs well. However, merged firms produce significantly more output than their competitors. As a result, mergers are not unprofitable. By analysing control treatments, we provide an explanation for these results based on the notion of aspiration levels, and show that the same logic also operates when a new firm enters a market. These results have some general consequences for adaptive play in changing environments.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali