Gift Exchange in A Multi-Worker Firm  

Oleh:

Maximiano, Sandra ; Sloof, Randolph ; Sonnemans, Joep

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 117 no. 522 (Jul. 2007), page 1025-1050.
Topik: gifts; studies; employee morale; compensation; game theory
Fulltext: 1025.pdf (281.7KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.26 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

One of the main findings of a large body of gift exchange experiments is that a considerable fraction of workers reward higher wages with higher effort. These results are observed for simple one - employer – one - worker relationships. In this article we investigate whether they generalise to the more realistic situation in which the employer employs several workers. We compare a bilateral gift exchange game with a treatment in which each employer has four workers. We find that effort levels in the latter treatment are only marginally lower. Gift exchange thus appears to be robust to increases in the size of the workforce.

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