Detail Efficient Provision of A Discrete Public Good   Oleh:  Gradstein, Mark Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 4 (1994), page 877-898. Topik: PUBLIC GOODS; provision; discrete public good Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel A discrete public good is characterized by a threshold production function : the good is provided if a certain number of contributors is reached. I consider a Bayesian framework where an individual's cost associated with his participation in the provision of a public good is private information. An efficient allocation mechanism is constructed when the outside option - available to individuals refusing to participate in the mechanism - is zero utility, and also for uniform uncertainty when the outside option is either voluntary contribution or forced contribution. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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