Asymmetric Information Acquistion and Behavior in Role Choice Models : An Endogenously Generated Signaling Game  

Oleh:

Reinganum, Jennifer F. ; Daughety, Andrew F.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 4 (1994), page 795-820.
Topik: BEHAVIOUR; asymmetric; information approach; behaviour; role choice; endogenously; signaling game

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We employ a static homogeneous - good duopoly model wherein firms can choose to produce in one of two periods. The model allows agents to acquire information and then traces the impact of the information pattern on subsequent production behaviour. Asymmetric information acquisition leads to a unique production role choice pattern: the informed (uninformed) firm chooses to assume the leader's (follower's) role. Moreover, if information is costly, the typical equilibrium involves only one firm acquiring information. Thus, identical firms with identical opportunities choose to become asymmetrically informed and produce sequentially : this is the unique (refined) equilibrium outcome.

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