Detail Opportunism and The Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts   Oleh:  Bac, Mehmet Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 34 no. 3 (1993), page 663-684. Topik: CONTRACTS; opportunism; incomplete contracts Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper studies a buyer - seller relationship where "quality" is not contractible but is affected by effort and the seller's privately known innate value. The seller's cost of effort is also private knowledge. Assuming constant outside opportunities, we show that more than two contracts is redundant, the sequence of contracts exhibits increasing prices and durations, and commitments for prices beyond the actual contract invite opportunism, not effort. The seller uses effort during the screening process, which improves non contractible quality. As a result, type - related information may have negative value when contracts are incomplete. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

Copyright © 2006, 2007 Unika Atma Jaya, all rights reserved