Detail Learning and Incentive Problems in Repeated Partnership   Oleh:  Hirao, Yukiko Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 34 no. 1 (1993), page 101-120. Topik: partnerships; learning; incentive problems; partnerships Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper analyzes optimal contracts for financing risky new projects in a two - period agency model. The principal and the agent both learn about the project quality, and the agent's unobservable actions affect the learning process. The parties have access to the credit market. Compared to the short - term contracts, the long - term contract induces the agent to work harder (less hard) in period one if his marginal effort in the first period increases (reduces) the value of information. In both cases, the long - term contract enables the parties to learn more about the project type. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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