Detail Continuous Time Repeated Games   Oleh:  Bergin, James ; MacLeod, W. Bentley Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 34 no. 1 (1993), page 21-38. Topik: time; continuous time; games Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel In this paper we develop a model of strategic behaviour in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies, that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time. The set of equilibria in this game may be large - in many cases equal to the feasible individually rational set of payoffs. We also study the restriction of renegotiation proofness in this framework, and apply these results to a Cournot duopoly example. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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