Detail Policy-Delegation and Fixed Exchange Rates   Oleh:  Hagen, Jurgen von Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 33 no. 4 (1992), page 849-870. Topik: DELEGATION; policy - delegation; exchange rates Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Recent literature interpreting the European Monetary System emphasizes credibility gains from delegating monetary policy to a low - inflation country through fixed exchange rates. This paper presents a model of an exchange rate system as a device for policy delegation in the context of a repeated monetary policy game. In contrast to single - shot games, it generates credibility gains for the high - inflation and low - inflation countries in the system. Credibility gains neither require nor imply hegemony of the low - inflation member. Stochastic realignments enable the members to adopt different inflation trends without destroying the credibility benefits from policy delegation. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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