The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R & D Policy in Battles for Monopoly  

Oleh:

Staiger, Robert W. ; Bagwell, Kyle

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 33 no. 4 (1992), page 795-816.
Topik: monopoly; sensitive; strategy; R & D; monopoly

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We characterize the role for R & D subsidies in export markets where R & D is an uncertain process and the winner of the R & D competition monopolizes the market. Investments are assumed to induce either first order or mean - preserving second order shifts in the distribution of a firm's costs or, reinterpreting the model as a patent race, a firm's discovery dates. We show that, regardless of which form the uncertainty takes, a national strategic incentive to subsidize R & D exists, but must be balanced against a national corrective incentive to tax R & D whenever a country has multiple firms involved in the R & D competition.

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