Detail A Theory of Fed Watching in A Macroeconomic Policy Game   Oleh:  Haslag, Joseph H. ; Balke, Nathan S. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 33 no. 3 (1992), page 619-628. Topik: MACROECONOMIC; fed watching; macro economic; policy game Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper examines the phenomenon of "Fed watching" within the context of a macro economic policy game. Following Cukierman and Meltzer's 1986 article, the policymaker's preferences are private information and noisy monetary control causes past observations of money growth to be a noisy signal of the monetary authority's future intentions. Individuals are allowed to acquire additional information about the monetary authority's preferences. Thus, both past observations of money growth and costly information about the policymaker's preferences are used by agents in forming expectations about policy. The public's acquisition of information alters the monetary authority's strategic calculus, making noisy monetary control less desirable. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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