Taxation and Welfare in An Oligopoly With Strategic Commitment  

Oleh:

Suzumura, Kotaro ; Besley, Timothy

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 33 no. 2 (1992), page 413-432.
Topik: oligopoly; taxation; welfare; oligopoly; strategic commitment

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper establishes comparative statics results for an oligopoly model with strategic commitment. Firms compete in two stages. In the first stage, firms decide on strategic cost - reducing R & D investment, whereas they choose output in the second stage. Taking an excise tax / subsidy as a shift parameter in the second stage game, the short - run as well as long - run effects on output, cost reducing R & D investment, and second-best welfare will be examined. The crucial role played by the strategic substitutability of outputs as well as cost -reducing R & D investments is clarified, and a variant of the Le Chatelier - Samuelson principle in our game - theoretic model is obtained.

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