Detail Social Welfare in A Common Property Oligopoly   Oleh:  Karp, Larry Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 33 no. 2 (1992), page 353-372. Topik: oligopoly; social welfare; common property; oligopoly Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Output in a Markov Nash - Cournot equilibrium to a noncooperative differential game in which m oligopolists extract a common property nonrenewable resource is bounded by the output of m-firm and (m - 1) - firm static oligopolies. We discuss the welfare effects of the number of firms and of the divergence between private and social discount rates. We compare extraction under the Markov and open - loop equilibria and then offer an explanation for the possibility that the resource is exhausted instantaneously in a continuous time game. This explanation does not depend on the fact that the period of commitment is infinitesimal. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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