Detail Bank Heterogencity, Reputation, and Debt Renegotiation   Oleh:  Fernandez, Raquel ; Kaaret, David Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 33 no. 1 (1992), page 61-78. Topik: BANKS; bank heterogeneity; reputation; debt renegotiation Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper examines a process of debt renegotiation in which banks possess divergent interests and there is asymmetric information. We assume that large banks must exert pressure on small banks in order to obtain participation of these in the provision of new money and in debt forgiveness. Making use of a reputational model, we argue that the effect of asymmetric information as to the amount of pressure that large banks can exert on small banks makes the debtor countries worse off than absent these asymmetries in information. This also provides a rationale for the growing popularity of exit bonds. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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