Detail The Impact of Quotas and Tariffs on Strategic R&D Behavior   Oleh:  Reitzes, James D. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 32 no. 4 (1991), page 985-1008. Topik: BEHAVIOUR; quotas; tariff; R & D behaviour Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Quotas and tariffs are compared in a two - stage Cournot duopoly game, where R & D is chosen initially and output is selected subsequently. Imposing a quota at or below the free - trade import level results in either a pure - strategy or a mixed - strategy equilibrium. Compared to an equally restrictive tariff, a quota leads to higher domestic profits, but lower domestic output and R & D (in a pure - strategy equilibrium). Furthermore, a quota and a tariff may often produce opposite effects on domestic R & D. A quota set above the free - trade import level may become binding, and may lead to multiple equilibria. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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