Detail The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in A Heterogeneous Cartel   Oleh:  Harrington, Joseph E. (Jr.) Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 32 no. 4 (1991), page 767-792. Topik: prices; price and output quotas; heterogeneous cartel Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel Applying a selection criterion which uses both subgame perfection and the Nash Bargaining Solution, this paper investigates the relationship between firms' cost functions and collusive behaviour. It is found that the optimal collusive price exceeds the price which the low - cost firm would set if it was a monopolist. Comparative statics reveal that the optimal collusive price is increasing in the low cost firm's unit cost but is decreasing in the high cost firm's unit cost when the cost differential between firms is sufficiently large. Furthermore, when the discount factor is relatively low but collusion is still supportable, the optimal market sharing arrangement is independent of firms' unit costs. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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