Detail Unemployment and Wages Under Worker Moral Hazard With Firm-Specific Cycles   Oleh:  Strand, Jon Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 32 no. 3 (1991), page 601-612. Topik: Wages; unemployment; moral hazard; firm - specific cycles Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel I study a model of efficiency wages due to worker moral hazard, where firms output prices shift between a high (H) and low (L) level. With no long - run wage commitments and identical treatment of workers, employment is cyclically rigid, and more so the shorter H periods are relative to L periods. When firms can commit to performance dependent wages, they instead prefer to first lay off young (untested) workers and pay them a lower initial wage, making employment more flexible. Private unemployment benefits are never paid to laid - off workers, even though temporary layoffs are never used to enforce effort. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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