Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behaviour ? Market Disciplne, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises  

Oleh:

Peria, Maria Soledad Martinez ; Schmukler, Sergio L.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 56 no. 3 (2001), page 1029-1051.
Topik: DEPOSIT INSURANCE; studies; deposit insurance; economic crisis; impact analysis; interest rates; investors; risk
Fulltext: p 1029.pdf (112.23KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper empirically investigates 2 issues largely unexplored by the literature on market discipline. The interaction between market discipline and deposit insurance and the impact of banking crises on market discipline are evaluated. The experiences of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico during the 1980s and 1990s are the focus. It is found that depositors discipline banks by withdrawing deposits and by requiring higher interest rates. Deposit insurance does not appear to diminish the extent of market discipline. Aggregate shocks affect deposits and interest rates during crises, regardless of bank fundamentals, and investors' responsiveness to bank risk taking increases in the aftermath of crises.

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