Valuation And Control in Venture Finance  

Oleh:

Kirilenko, Andrei A.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 56 no. 2 (2001), page 565-587.
Topik: FINANCE; venture capital companies; entrepreneurs; models; studies
Fulltext: p 565.pdf (120.2KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm. It is assumed that the entrepreneur derives nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm. To separate the entrepreneur's value of control from the firm's expected payoff, the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment. The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.

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