Detail Existence of Equilibrium in A Lobbying Economy   Oleh:  Roe, Terry L. ; Coggins, Jay S. ; Graham-Tomasi, Theodore Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 32 no. 3 (1991), page 533-550. Topik: equilibrium; existence; equilibrium; lobbying economy Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper establishes the existence of equilibrium in a model with a central authority that sets relative prices in response to agents' political activity. To a small open economy we graft a government price setting program that responds to the lobbying pressure of opposing interests. The proof involves reformulating the lobbying economy as a noncooperative generalized game, establishing the existence of an equilibrium in the game, and showing that a game equilibrium is an equilibrium in the economy. Agents' choice sets are found to be nonconvex, a difficulty that we resolve by an appropriate restriction on preferences. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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