Managerial Ability, Compensation, And The Closed - End Fund Discount  

Oleh:

Berk, Jonathan B. ; Stanton, Richard

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 62 no. 2 (Apr. 2007), page 529-556.
Topik: FUND; studies; portfolio management; closed end funds; models
Fulltext: p 529.pdf (696.28KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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This paper shows that the existence of managerial ability, combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry, implies that the closed - end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature. We evaluate the model's ability to match the quantitative features of the data, and find that it does well, although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained.

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