Lower Salaries And No Options ? On The Optimal Structure of Executive Pay  

Oleh:

Dittmann, Ingolf ; Maug, Ernst

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 62 no. 1 (Feb. 2007), page 303-344.
Topik: SALARIES; chief executive officers; executive compensation; stock options; agency theory; studies
Fulltext: p 303.pdf (240.75KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We calibrate the standard principal-agent model with constant relative risk aversion and lognormal stock prices to a sample of 598 U. S. CEOs. We show that this model predicts that most CEOs should not hold any stock options. Instead, CEOs should have lower base salaries and receive additional shares in their companies; many would be required to purchase additional stock in their companies. These contracts would reduce average compensation costs by 20% while providing the same incentives and the same utility to CEOs. We conclude that the standard principal-agent model typically used in the literature cannot rationalize observed contracts.

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