A Theory of Friendly Boards  

Oleh:

Adams, Renee B. ; Ferreira, David

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 62 no. 1 (Feb. 2007), page 217-250.
Topik: BOARDS OF DIRECTORS; boards of directors; chief executive officers; professional relationships; manageemnt theory; roles; studies
Fulltext: p 217.pdf (177.7KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We analyze the consequences of the board's dual role as advisor as well as monitor of management. Given this dual role, the CEO faces a trade - off in disclosing information to the board: If he reveals his information, he receives better advice, however, an informed board will also monitor him more intensively. Since an independent board is a tougher monitor, the CEO may be reluctant to share information with it. Thus, management - friendly boards can be optimal. Using the insights from the model, we analyze the differences between sole and dual board systems. We highlight several policy implications of our analysis.

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