International Transfers : Strategic Losses and The Blocking of Mutually Advantageous Transfers  

Oleh:

Yano, Makoto

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 32 no. 2 (1991), page 371-382.
Topik: blocking; international transfers; strategic; blocking; mutually advantageous

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Recent studies indicate the possibility that, in the more - than - two - country model, a coalition may block a competitive equilibrium by means of mutually advantageous transfers among its members. This study demonstrates that even the equilibrium which is to be established after a mutually advantageous transfer may be blocked. In order to form a blocking coalition, a country may take a strategic loss, i. e., give or receive a transfer which reduces its own utility. This provides a possible reason why a country may, not out of benevolence, give or receive a transfer which it knows to reduce its own utility.

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