Efficiency and Disagreement in Repeated Infinite Horizon Bargaining Games  

Oleh:

Dearden, James A.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 32 no. 2 (1991), page 267-278.
Topik: efficiency; efficiency; disagreement; infinite horizon; bargaining games

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Satterthwaite and Williams (1987) characterize regular equilibria of the sealed bid k - double auction that, in some cases, are efficient. The sealed bid k - double auction specifies one period of simultaneous offers and requires agents to sometimes disagree at the end of the first period when gains from continued bargaining exist. This paper constructs a theory of disagreement based on reputation in repeated bargaining games. Agents make the offers of a Satterthwaite - Williams regular equilibrium in the first round of a negotiation. Then, if no trade results, the agents terminate the negotiation in spite of possible gains from the option of continued bargaining.

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