Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points  

Oleh:

Rosenkranz, Stephanie ; Schmitz, Patrick W.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 117 no. 520 (Apr. 2007), page 637-653.
Topik: auction; studies; auctions; bidders; prices; economic models
Fulltext: 637.pdf (169.58KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.25 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We consider second - price and first - price auctions in the symmetric independent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the assumption that the bidders have reference - based utility, where a publicly announced reserve price has some influence on the reference point. It turns out that the seller's optimal reserve price increases with the number of bidders. Also in contrast to the standard model, we find that secret reserve prices can outperform public reserve prices, and that setting the optimal reserve price can be more valuable for the seller than attracting additional bidders.

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