Optimal Unemployment Insurance With Monitoring and Sanctions  

Oleh:

Boone, Jan ; Fredriksson, Peter ; Holmlund, Bertil ; Ours, Jan C. van

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 117 no. 518 (Mar. 2007), page 399-421.
Topik: Unemployment; unempolyment; insurance; monitoring and sanctions
Fulltext: 399.pdf (576.57KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.25 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This article analyses the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs ; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt.

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