Social Connections and Group Banking  

Oleh:

Karlan, Dean S.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 117 no. 517 (Feb. 2007), page F52-F84.
Topik: BANKING; social connections; group banking
Fulltext: F52.pdf (561.78KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.24 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA - Peru, I exploit a quasi - random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully monitoring and enforcing joint - liability loans. Individuals with stronger social connections to their fellow group members (i. e., either living closer or being of a similar culture) have higher repayment and higher savings. Furthermore, I observe direct evidence that relationships deteriorate after default, and that through successful monitoring, individuals know who to punish and who not to punish after default.

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