Philosophical Analysis and the Moral Concept of Racism  

Oleh:

Garcia, J.L.A.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Philosophy & Social Criticism vol. 25 no. 5 (Sep. 1999), page 1–32.
Topik: Benjamin DeMott ; Dinesh D’Souza ; existentialism ; Lewis Gordon ; moral concepts ; Michael Omi ; racism ; social formation ; Howard Winant
Fulltext: 1PSC255.pdf (312.53KB)

Isi artikel

This paper uses tools of philosophical analysis critically to examine accounts of the nature of racism that have recently been offered by writers including existentialist philosopher Lewis Gordon, conservative theorist Dinesh D’Souza, and sociologists Michael Omi and Howard Winant. These approaches, which conceive of racism either as a bad-faith choice to believe, a doctrine, or as a type of ‘social formation’, are found wanting for a variety of reasons, especially that they cannot comprehend some forms of racism. I propose an account that conceives racism chiefly as a motivational/volitional matter, in short, as a form of moral viciousness. I show how this approach offers a unified account that comprises inter alia individual and institutional racism, expressed and unexpressed racism. I point out advantages that my view has over Thomas Schmid’s somewhat similar suggestion, and use the account to examine a number of claims made about racism by H. L. Gates, Jr, Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, Gertrude Ezorsky, and others. Finally, I defend this approach from the general criticism that Benjamin DeMott has levelled against any effort so to understand racism.

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