Rights Without Dignity?: Some Critical Reflections on Habermas’s Procedural Model of Law and Democracy  

Oleh:

Mahoney, Jon

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Philosophy & Social Criticism vol. 27 no. 3 (Mei 2001), page 21–40.
Topik: autonomy ; deontological reasons ; Habermas ; moral injury ; proceduralism ; rights
Fulltext: 21PSC273.pdf (82.39KB)

Isi artikel

I argue that Habermas’s proposed system of rights fails to offer an adequate account of the relation between rights and moral injury. In providing a non-moral justification for rights, Habermas’s functionalnormative argument excludes the moral intuition that persons are worthy of being protected from a class of injurious actions (i.e. false imprisonment, religious persecution). Habermas does offer clearly stated reasons for his proposed normative, yet non-moral foundation for a legitimate legal order, including the claim that the functional imperatives of modern legal systems cannot be reduced to morality. My positive thesis is that at least some rights are moral norms whose content and justification derive from a moral point of view informed by the idea of persons as free and equal.

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