The Foundations of Freezeout Laws in Takeovers  

Oleh:

Amihud, Yakov ; Sundaram, Rangarajan K. ; Kahan, Marcel

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 59 no. 3 (Jun. 2004), page 1325-1344.
Topik: FOUNDATION; hostile takeovers; economic theory; mathematical models; stock prices; shareholders rights; securities regulations
Fulltext: p 1325.pdf (126.74KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We provide an economic basis for permitting freezeouts of nontendering shareholders following successful takeovers. We describe a specific freezeout mechanism based on easily verifiable information that induces desirable efficiency and welfare properties in models of both corporations with widely dispersed shareholdings and corporations with large pivotal shareholders. The mechanism dominates previous proposals along some important dimensions. We also examine takeover premia that arise in the presence of competition among raiders. Our mechanism is closely related to the practice of takeover law in the United States, thus, our analysis may be thought of as analyzing the economic foundations of current regulations.

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