The Economical Control of Infectious Diseases  

Oleh:

Gersovitz, Mark ; Hammer, Jeffrey S.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 114 no. 492 (Jan. 2004), page 1-27.
Topik: ECONOMIC; economical control; infectious diseases
Fulltext: 1.pdf (189.53KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.12 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

The structure of representative agents and decentralisation of the social planner's problem provide a framework for the economics of infection and associated externalities. Optimal implementation of prevention and therapy depends on : (1) biology including whether infection is person to person or by vectors ; (2) whether the infected progress to recovery and susceptibility, immunity, or death ; (3) costs of interventions ; (4) whether interventions target everyone, the uninfected, the infected, or contacts between the two ; (5) individual behaviour leading to two types of externalities. By way of example, if people recover to be susceptible, government subsidies should equally favour prevention and therapy.

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