Innovation by Leaders  

Oleh:

Etro, Federico

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 114 no. 495 (Apr. 2004), page 281-303.
Topik: innovation; innovation; leaders
Fulltext: 281.pdf (168.48KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.13 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

A new rationale for the persistence of monopolies is based on a precommitment of the incumbent monopolist to invest in R&D. In a patent race, as long as entry is free, the Arrow effect disappears: the incumbent has more incentives to invest than any outsider. Paradoxically, a market with some persistence of monopoly is competitive, while one with continuous leapfrogging must hide some barriers to entry. When the size of innovations is endogenous, leaders invest in more radical innovations. If there is a sequence of innovations, cycling investment emerges. Finally, I apply the idea to a general equilibrium model of Schumpeterian growth with persistence of monopoly.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali