Labor Migration Policy and the Governance of the Construction Industry in Israel and Japan  

Oleh:

Bartram, David

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Politics & Society vol. 32 no. 2 (Jun. 2004), page 131-170.
Topik: foreign workers; immigration policy; state structure; Israel; Japan
Fulltext: 131PS322.pdf (208.02KB)

Isi artikel

Significant “guestworker” immigration occurs when the state lacks the capacity to inhibit rent-seeking by private interests that benefit from imported labor. Policies allowing imported labor result in government subsidies for employers’ profits. These subsidies are usefully conceived as rents. A developmentalist state (e.g. Japan) will constrain the creation of such rents, especially because imported labor carries long-term costs not borne by employers and inhibits productivity growth and positive structural change. A clientelist state (e.g. Israel) falls prey to this type of rent-seeking because of a weaker institutional capacity for creating conditions that make alternative solutions feasible and profitable for employers.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali