| The security dilemma, first coined by John Herz in 1950, has come to explain why states that do not seek to harm one another can still end up in competition and war. Its very essence is one of tragedy. The security dilemma has been expounded since by a number of authors, and in this article I examine one such development; Jack Snyder's definition of the security dilemma, being applicable where one state requires the insecurity of another. I label this a state-induced security dilemma. I argue that in order for this to be an accurate expansion of the security dilemma, the essence of tragedy must be retained. I suggest that with some refinement Snyder's definition does extend the application of the security dilemma and raises important questions regarding the dilemma's mitigation and escape. I have used the relationship between China and Taiwan to elucidate the utility of the state-induced security dilemma. |