Structural Conditions of Preferences for Segregation: An Application of Coleman’s ‘Linear System of Action’  

Oleh:

Kalter, Frank

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Rationality and Society vol. 12 no. 4 (Nov. 2000), page 425–449.
Topik: Coleman; discrimination; exchange systems; segregation; simulation
Fulltext: 425RS124.pdf (260.2KB)

Isi artikel

Why might rational actors be interested in establishing a system of segregation, and under what structural conditions will this be more or less likely? To answer these questions, Coleman’s ‘linear system of action’ serves as a starting point. It can be shown that, given a random assignment of interest and control, a considerable number of actors may gain by splitting the group according to a binary ascriptive characteristic. Furthermore, it is not unlikely that they will indeed come to a respective agreement because ascriptive characteristics serve as focal points in collective decision-making. With the help of computer simulations, how the likelihood of group separation is affected by several structural parameters can be analyzed. It is evident that increasing the number of goods exchanged within a given system is a good recipe for preventing segregation.

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