The Logic of Collective Belief  

Oleh:

Caplan, Bryan

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Rationality and Society vol. 15 no. 2 (Mei 2003), page 218-242.
Topik: collective choice; irrationality; political failure The trouble with people is not that they don't know but that they know so much that ain't so. Josh Billings; in Caruth and Ehrlich (1988: 205)
Fulltext: 218RS152.pdf (592.58KB)

Isi artikel

Many political failure arguments implicitly assume that voters are irrational. This article argues that this assumption is both theoretically and empirically plausible: in politics, rationality, like information, is a collective good that individuals have little incentive to supply. In consequence, voters are frequently not only rationally ignorant but also `rationally irrational'. Rational irrationality leads to both demand-side and supply-side political failures: competition not only pressures politicians to act on voters' biased estimates, but selects for politicians who genuinely share those biases. The analytical framework also sheds new light on log-rolling, political shirking and advertising, and politicians' human capital.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali