Covenants Without Swords Group Identity, Norms, and Communication in Social Dilemmas  

Oleh:

Bicchieri, Cristina

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Rationality and Society vol. 14 no. 2 (Mei 2002), page 192-228.
Topik: communication; cooperation; group identity; social dilemmas; social norms
Fulltext: 192RS142.pdf (189.84KB)

Isi artikel

In one-shot social dilemma experiments, cooperation rates dramatically increase if subjects are allowed to communicate before making a choice. There are two possible explanations for this `communication effect'. One is that communication enhances group identity, the other is that communication elicits social norms. I discuss both views and argue in favor of a norm-based explanation.

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