Conflict Measures in Cooperative Exchange Models of Collective Decision-Making  

Oleh:

Assen, Marcel van ; Stokman, Frans ; Oosten, Reinier Van

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Rationality and Society vol. 15 no. 1 (Feb. 2003), page 85-112.
Topik: cooperative game theory; European Union; externalities; models of collective decision-making; network exchange theory; social exchange
Fulltext: 85RS151.pdf (269.52KB)

Isi artikel

This study focuses on externalities of exchanges of voting positions in collective decision-making. Exchanges are represented by nonconstant two-person cooperative games. It is assumed that the rate of exchange is speci®ed by the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, and a model is speci®ed to identify the exchanges. Externality effects of these exchanges are assessed with two con¯ict measures we develop here. The measures assess within-group and between-group con¯ict, respectively, and are applied to collective decision-making in the European Union regarding support for ®shery infrastructure. The application shows that the measures provide indispensable insights into the decision-making setting and that these can be used for strategic intervention in the setting. It also shows that both actors' power and the outcomes in exchange with externalities are very different from those in exchange without externalities as studied by theories of network exchange.

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