Identifying Latent ConflictT in Collective Bargaining  

Oleh:

Achterkamp, Marjolein ; Akkerman, Agnes

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Rationality and Society vol. 15 no. 1 (Feb. 2003), page 15-43.
Topik: collective bargaining; industrial con¯icts; industrial relations; labour unions; models of collective decisionmaking; simulation; strikes; trade unions
Fulltext: 15RS151.pdf (179.21KB)

Isi artikel

The purpose of this article is to ®nd indicators of the substantive incentives for industrial con¯ict. We argue that collective decisionmaking models can be helpful in developing such a measurement tool. These indicators will enable scholars in industrial relations to distinguish the substantive incentives from other reasons for calling out strikes, e.g. union internal political incentives or trade union competition for members. The models we use are the expected utility model of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and the exchange model of Frans Stokman and Reinier van Oosten. These models differ in their assumptions on how the collective bargaining process proceeds. The expected utility model is based on the assumption that actors reach collective decisions after threats and con¯ict. The exchange model is based on a cooperative strategy. Our indicators of industrial con¯ict are tested on a data set with information on 29 collective agreement negotiations in which 90 trade unions are nested. The data set contains instances of both industrial con¯ict and peaceful settlements of collective agreements. The results show that the indicator based on the expected utility model is a good indicator of industrial con¯ict, whereas that based on the exchange model is a poor one. This seems to contradict ®ndings in previous applications of both models of collective bargaining, in which the exchange model provided the most accurate predictions of the bargaining outcomes. We conclude that although the exchange model provides better predictions at the aggregate level (the collective outcome), the expected utility model generates superior predictions of the individual positions after bargaining.

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