Winner-Take-a-Hike Markets: The Arrogant Agent Problem in a Model of Devious Colleague Selection  

Oleh:

Haight, Alan Day

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Review of Radical Political Economics vol. 35 no. 3 (Sep. 2003), page 241-247.
Topik: discrimination; insider-outsider; principal-agent; positional goods; glass ceiling; returns to education
Fulltext: 241RRPE353.pdf (51.95KB)

Isi artikel

To protect their office rank and “strutils” (which are utils obtained by strutting around the office), the senior professionals in a law firm or academic department sometimes resort to devious prescreening of job applicants, passing over the best candidates. This practice is more tempting for a hiring professional who is wealthy, in a large organization, and (perhaps) in a bad marriage. A diagram depicts the trade-off between office status and pecuniary income. Winner-take-a-hike deceptions may distort returns to schooling, contribute to the glass ceiling, and motivate both discrimination and reverse discrimination toward women and ethnic minorities.

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