The Dynamics of Statistical Discrimination  

Oleh:

Blume, Lawrence E.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 116 no. 515 (2006), page F480-F498.
Topik: discrimination; dynamics; statistical discrimination
Fulltext: F480.pdf (548.84KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.23 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This article demonstrates how learning dynamics select among equilibria in a statistical discrimination model of employment. The static market model exhibits multiple equilibria. The belief revision dynamics generate a Markov market process which, in the long run, is mostly near one and only one of the static equilibria, regardless of initial conditions. Usually policy effects appear in comparative statics, where the equilibrium set moves with different policies. But here policy is also seen to effect which equilibrium is selected even when it has no comparative statics effect at all.

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