Search Profiling With Partial Knowledge of Deterrence  

Oleh:

Manski, Charles F.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 116 no. 515 (2006), page F385-F401.
Topik: KNOWLEDGE; profiling; partial knowledge; deterrence
Fulltext: F385.pdf (505.27KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.23 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Consider the choice of a profiling policy where decisions to search for evidence of crime may vary with observable covariates of the persons at risk of search. I pose a planning problem whose objective is to minimise the social cost of crime and search. The consequences of a search rule depend on the extent to which search deters crime. I study the planning problem when the planner has partial knowledge of deterrence. I show how the planner can eliminate dominated search rules and how he can use the minimax or minimax - regret criterion to choose an undominated rule.

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