Executive Stock Options : Early Exercise Provisions And Risk - Taking Incentives  

Oleh:

Brisley, Neil

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 61 no. 5 (Okt. 2006), page 2487-2510.
Topik: stock; studies; stock options; executive compensation; risk assessment; stock prices; models
Fulltext: p 2487.pdf (294.32KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

Traditional executive stock option plans allow fixed numbers of options to vest periodically, independent of stock price performance. Because such options may climb deep in the money long before the manager can exercise them, they can exacerbate risk aversion in project selection. Making the proportion of options that vest a gradually increasing function of the stock price can ensure that appropriate numbers of options aer retained while they provide risk taking incentives, but are exercised once they have lost their convexity. Progressive performance vesting can allow the firm more efficiently to rebalance the manager's risk taking incentives.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali