Inequality Aversion in A Variety of Games - An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis  

Oleh:

Guth, Werner ; Napel, Stefan

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 116 no. 514 (2006), page 1037-1056.
Topik: GAMES; inequality aversion; variety games; evolutionary analysis
Fulltext: 1037.pdf (527.63KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.23 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

The indirect evolutionary approach integrates forward - looking evaluation of opportunities and adaptation in the light of the past. Subjective motivation determines behaviour, but long - run evolutionary success of motivational types depends on objective factors only. This can justify intrinsic aversion to inequality in reward allocation games. Whereas earlier analysis was restricted to specific games, this article considers a more complex environment comprising different games which – studied in isolation – yield opposite implications. Persistent divergence between intrinsic motivation and true material success is possible depending on the definition of inequality aversion as well as on agents' ability to discriminate between games.

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