What Follows ? Mind Dependence, Fallibility and Transcendence According to (Strong) Constructionism's Realist and Quasi - Realist Critics  

Oleh:

Held, Barbara S.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Theory and Psychology vol. 12 no. 5 (Okt. 2002), page 651–670.
Topik: dependence; agency; epistemology; fallibilism; mind dependence; objective knowledge; ontology of human kinds; realism; social constructionism; quasi; critics
Fulltext: 651TP125.pdf (94.48KB)

Isi artikel

In the June 2001 special issue of this journal devoted to 'Social Constructionism and Its Critics', some critics take (strong) constructionism to task for its many problems and internal contradictions - most notably, the failure of its advocates to acknowledge their own (ontological and epistemological) commitments and realism. Other critics attempt to save constructionism from these charges by finding a less strident form of realism - what I will call a 'quasi-realism' - within constructionism. After examining Gergen's insistence that we attend not to the truth of any given discourse but rather to the question 'what follows?' when we adopt any given discourse, I consider each critic's own view about what epistemology necessarily follows (and does not follow) from the ontological doctrine he or she seeks to defend. I focus my attention on the epistemological consequences, including the potential for fallibility / error, that follow from the investigation of those ontological entities understood to be human kinds, kinds that are mind-dependent in diverse ways and so must be understood with more ontological clarity. I conclude with discussion of the striving for transcendence (by way of defending some form of human agency) that often seems to fuel the constructionist campaign.

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