Inconsistencies in The Assumptions of Constructivism and Naturalism : An Alternative View  

Oleh:

Praetorius, Nini

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Theory and Psychology vol. 13 no. 4 (Agu. 2003), page 511–540.
Topik: NATURALISM; cartesian dualism; constructivism; mind - body dualism; mind – matter dualism; mind – reality dualism; naturalism; reductionism; social constructionism; inconsistencies; assumption; naturalism; view
Fulltext: 511TP134.pdf (134.36KB)

Isi artikel

The paper discusses the flaws in the solutions proposed by philosophical positions of constructivism and naturalism of the mind–body and mind - lity problems to which Cartesian dualism gives rise. It is argued that subscribing - licitly or implicitly - to the assumptions of these philosophical positions by two research traditions within current academic psychology, that is, social constructionism and cognitive neuroscience, the flaws and problems that these positions inherit cease to be of merely 'philosophical' interest, but become flaws in the foundations of the science of psychology. More importantly, the aim is to show how arguments in refutation of the assumptions of naturalism and constructivism in turn suggest and point to tenable alternative assumptions about the relation between mind and reality and between mind and body, which - as a matter of principle - must be taken for granted by both philosophy and psychology.

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