Detail Standard Auctions With Identity-Dependent Externalities   Oleh:  Varma, Gopal Das Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 33 no. 4 (2002), page 689-708. Topik: auction; auctions; identity - dependent; externalities Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel I analyze equilibrium bidding behaviour in the open ascending-bid auction with identity - dependent externalities. With reciprocal externalities, the allocation is determined by bidders' consumption values alone. With large nonreciprocal externalities, the open auction generates higher expected revenue compared to standard sealed - bid auctions. The progress of the open auction reveals more information about the identity of the potential winner, allowing active bidders greater opportunity to avoid incurring payoff - reducing externalities. The associated option value to staying active up until a relatively high price translates into higher expected revenue. Multiple bidders may sequentially quit at the same price, and relative to sealed - bid auctions, bidders experience less ex post regret. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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