Informational Externalities in Settlement Bargaining : Confidentially and Correlated Culpability  

Oleh:

Reinganum, Jennifer F. ; Daughety, Andrew F.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: The Rand Journal of Economics vol. 33 no. 4 (2002), page 587-604.
Topik: bargaining power; informational externalities; bargaining; confidentiality; culpability

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: RR10.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We explore informational externalities that arise when multiple plaintiffs are harmed by the behaviour or product of a single defendant. An early plaintiff is likely to raise the awareness of a later plaintiff, and the later plaintiff will be able to learn something about the defendant's culpability by observing the disposition of the early suit : the presence of an early plaintiff provides a benefit to a later plaintiff. The presence of the later plaintiff also confers a potential benefit on the early plaintiff : the early plaintiff has the opportunity to charge the defendant for controlling the flow of information (e. g., through confidential settlement).

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